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Abstract: We describe the evolution of three types of corporate securities in Argentina, namely, corporate 
bonds, asset-backed securities and deferred checks. Corporate bonds (obligaciones negociables) were legally 
authorized in 1988, and after a tax reform in 1991 they became an important financing vehicle. Asset backed 
securities (fideicomisos), legally created in 1995, have been issued since 1996. They typically bundle together 
small credits of a similar category. Deferred checks (cheques de pago diferido) exist since 1993, alongside 
standard checks. They can be negotiated on the exchange since 2003, and are akin to commercial paper. 
Corporate bonds have been overwhelmingly issued by large firms and banks, with an average issue size of 53 
million dollars.  Asset backed securities  have an average  value of 9  million dollars.  Deferred checks are 
typically used by smaller firms, and those traded on the exchange of the Buenos Aires board of trade have an 
average value of 9 thousand dollars. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Until 1988, firms had to depend mainly on bank loans as a source of finance. While large 
firms also had access to private placements, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) used 
trade credit and postdated checks a lot. With the emergence of new private securities, the 
situation has changed substantially since then. 
We  review  the  evolution  of  three  securities  now  issued  by  private  firms.  First, 
corporate  bonds  (obligaciones  negociables).  Second,  asset  basked  securities  (fondos 
fiduciarios).  Third,  deferred  checks  (cheques  de  pago  diferido),  which  are  akin  to 
commercial paper. While corporate bonds are mainly issued by large firms, the other two 
instruments are basically used as a means of financing by SMEs. 
A common characteristic of all three instruments is that the emergence of these 
markets  is  pretty  recent.  Though  corporate  bonds  exist  since  1988,  the  corporate  bond 
market only took off after the government instituted tax changes in 1991.
1 Asset backed 
securities appeared in 1996, after the appropriate legal framework was approved in 1995. 
Deferred checks became a financing alternative in 1993, replacing the informal institution 
of post-dated checks used until then by small firms. Since 2003, they have been exchanged 
on the Merval (Mercado de Valores), the exchange associated to the Bolsa de Comercio the 
Buenos Aires (BCBA). 
 
II. Corporate bonds 
 
A. Primary markets 
 
The possibility of issuing corporate bonds (obligaciones negociables or ON in Argentina) 
appeared when Law 23.576 was approved in 1988. The law allowed corporate bonds to be 
issued  by  incorporated  companies,  cooperatives  and  other  organizations.  The  principal 
                                                 
1  In  Fernández,  González,  Pernice  and  Streb  (2007),  the  evolution  of  corporate  bonds  are  reviewed  in 
conjuction with the behavior, over the 1985-2005 period, of sovereign bonds and bank loans. Section II of this 
document is mostly based on that review of corporate bonds.   3 
could  be  indexed,  interest  rates  could  be  fixed  or  variable,  issues  could  be  in  foreign 
currency, payments could be made  abroad, and there was free entry  and exit from the 
country. 
This law on corporate bonds was modified in 1991 by Law 23.962. It was only then 
that the market for bonds started to take off and develop. The modification introduced in 
1991 basically had to do with tax exemptions of the value-added tax (VAT), the income tax 
and taxes on the transfer of bond instruments (títulos valores), giving corporate bonds the 
same tax treatment as sovereign bonds. All this had a positive impact on the incentives to 
issue  corporate  bonds.  This  leveled  the  field  with  bank  loans;  before  that,  companies 
basically preferred bank loans because of tax deductions allowed. 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were provided soon after with a simplified 
system to issue bonds that could be quoted on stock exchanges, to broaden their financing 
sources.  By  Decree  1.087  of  1993,  SMEs  were  authorized  to  issue  bonds,  with  the 
obligation of registering the bonds in the Comisión Nacional de Valores, the local securities 
exchange  commission,  and  of  complying  with  certain  specific  requirements  of  that 
commission. The restrictions which this simplified system imposed on SMEs had to do 
with the amount issued, the maturity and the type of investors. The maximum amount per 
firm was set at 5 million pesos. The bonds issued under this regime for SMEs could only be 
purchased  by  qualified  investors  within  certain  categories,  for  example,  public 
organizations, pension funds, and individuals with certain minimum capital. Despite this 
simplified regime, bond finance is typical of large firms rather than SMEs. 
Table 1 shows the evolution of corporate bonds as a percentage of GDP, while 
Table 2 shows their evolution in millions of dollars. The increase in nominal terms in 2002 
in Table 1, as a percentage of GDP, merely reflects the threefold devaluation of the peso, 
with  a  stock  that  was  almost  completely  in  dollars.  The  figures  are  not  corrected  for 
pesification of bonds in dollars under domestic law. 
These figures are based on a database constructed with information from the Bolsa 
de Comercio de Buenos Aires (BCBA). This data was complemented  with information 
from the Comisión Nacional de Valores (CNV), to reflect as far as possible all corporate 
bonds that have been issued, not only those bonds registered to trade in the BCBA. Some 
information was also drawn from Mercado Abierto Electrónico (MAE). Bedoya, González,   4 
Pernice, Streb, Czerwonko and Díaz Santillán (2007) explain in detail the construction of 
the database of corporate bonds. 
 
Table 1. Stock of bonds issued by the corporate sector (as a percentage of GDP) 
  Domestic currency  Foreign 
Currency 
Total 




   
1989  0  0  0  0  0 
1990  0  0  0  0.05  0.08 
1991  0.05  0  0  0.31  0.36 
1992  0.06  0  0  0.94  1.00 
1993  0.05  0  0  2.57  2.61 
1994  0.04  0  0  3.53  3.57 
1995  0.04  0  0  4.23  4.27 
1996  0.03  0  0  4.86  4.89 
1997  0.11  0  0  6.82  6.93 
1998  0.09  0  0  8.32  8.41 
1999  0.15  0  0  8.82  8.96 
2000  0.15  0  0  8.50  8.66 
2001  0.19  0  0  8.00  8.19 
2002  0.15  0  0  17.03  17.17 
2003  0.12  0.01  0  11.97  11.75 
2004  0.17  0  0  9.31  9.48 
2005  0.14  0  0  7.63  7.78 
Notes: Year-end figures. This information does not distinguish between domestic and foreign law issues. Our database was  
constructed with information from Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires (BCBA), Mercado Abierto Electrónico (MAE) and 
Comisión Nacional de Valores (CNV). 
 
Table 2. Stock of bonds issued by the corporate sector (in millions of dollars) 
Year  Domestic currency  Foreign 
Currency 
Total 




   
1989  6  0  0  0  6 
1990  37  0  0  62  99 
1991  89  0  0  514  603 
1992  126  0  0  1,980  2,106 
1993  117  0  0  6,072  6,189 
1994  105  0  0  9,083  9,187 
1995  93  0  0  10,933  11,026 
1996  82  0  0  13,227  13,309 
1997  325  0  0  20,013  20,338 
1998  258  0  0  24,896  25,154 
1999  407  0  0  25,014  25,422 
2000  445  0  0  24,182  24,626 
2001  522  0  0  21,346  21,867 
2002  151  0  0  16,804  16,954 
2003  153  11  0  14,787  14,951 
2004  260  10  0  14,136  14,405 
2005  259  8  0  13,829  14,096 
Notes: Year-end figures. This information does not distinguish between domestic and foreign law issues. Our database was  
constructed with information from Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires (BCBA), Mercado Abierto Electrónico (MAE) and 
Comisión Nacional de Valores (CNV). 
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Table 3, based on the database in Bedoya et al. (2007), shows the number of issues 
per year, the total amount issued, and the average size of each issue for those corporate 
bonds for which we have both amount issued and date of issue. 
 






(in millions of dollars) 
Average value 
(in millions of dollars) 
1989  2  6  3 
1990  10  98  10 
1991  16  522  33 
1992  52  1,621  31 
1993  68  4,805  71 
1994  77  4,030  52 
1995  105  3,605  34 
1996  106  4,904  46 
1997  176  9,715  55 
1998  175  10,611  61 
1999  143  6,523  46 
2000  104  6,569  63 
2001  89  3,896  44 
2002  39  2,923  75 
2003  45  1,968  44 
2004  39  3,409  87 
2005  21  1,963  93 
Total  1,267  67,167  53 
Notes: For 1267 bonds we have both amount issued and date of issue, out of a total of 1356 bonds in database. The year 
2005 covers up to September. 
 
Table 3 shows that the average size of the corporate bond issues of slightly above 50 
million dollars is extremely large when compared to the average size of the issues of asset-
backed securities and deferred checks, which are described in Tables 10 and 11 below. 
Hence, this instrument is typical of large firms. Despite the special regime for SMEs, which 
allowed  issues  of  not  more  than  5  million  dollars  during  Convertibility,  there  were 
relatively few operations of that type, so they did not affect the total average much. 
Figure 1 shows the composition of corporate debt in terms of financial and non-
financial issuers. The issue of corporate bonds was nil until 1989. The market started to 
become significant in 1991. After ten years of rapid growth, the stock of outstanding bonds 
leveled off after 1998, and started falling in 2001. The stock of corporate bonds from 2002 
on is preliminary, insofar as it is based on the original conditions at time of issue and does 
not reflect pesification and default. 
   6 
Figure 1. Amount outstanding of corporate bonds and amount issued by financial 
institutions (in billions of dollars) 
Source: our database of corporate bonds from Argentina. 
 
Almost  all  corporate  bonds  were  issued  in  foreign  currency  (almost  all  in  US 
dollars). However, Tables 1 and 2 do not have a breakdown of these bonds according to 
domestic or foreign legislation. This breakdown is a key issue, because by Decree 214 of 
2002, Article 8, all debt in foreign currency not related to the financial system, as was the 
case of corporate bonds, was converted to pesos at a ratio of one dollar equal to one peso, 
and by Article 4 the resulting amount was indexed by CER, a unit linked to the CPI to 
reflect past inflation. Of course, this decree only applied to debt under domestic legislation, 
not to debt under foreign legislation. Firms made use of this decree, so this marks a huge 
difference between domestic and foreign law corporate bonds. 
The 2002 devaluation was different from past experiences in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In that period, devaluation melted down company debt denominated in domestic currency, 
leaving the company in a better financial situation. On the contrary, the 2002 devaluation 
provoked a financial suffocation in those companies that had begun to get deeply indebted 
abroad, because unlike the 1981/82 financial crisis the government did not take over private 
debt abroad, since the government itself fell into default. Though bank debt in dollars was 

































































































Financial  7 
private sector had been continuously falling since 1998. Since we do not know the share in 
total bond debt of corporate bonds issued under domestic legislation, we cannot evaluate 
how much relief the pesification decree provided through this channel to highly indebted 
firms. However, during the Convertibility years, the ease of access to external credit and 
the good international financial conditions had stimulated the growth of financing abroad 
for large firms. 
In early 2002, risk-rating agencies placed most firms in selective default as regards 
liabilities in foreign currency. This rating was based on the fact that with the 2001 crisis, 
besides the devaluation, a series of government restrictions were put in place. Foremost, the 
central  bank  started  to  control  the  remittance  of  foreign  currency  abroad,  and  an 
authorization  was  required  to  make  payments  abroad.  This  came  together  with  great 
uncertainty about the final effects of the abandonment of Convertibility, in a context of 
government default, generalized violation of contracts, restrictions to withdraw funds from 
the financial system, and pesification of public service rates, deposits and debt. However, 
some companies were a lot less exposed than others to these risks. The greatest probability 
of default was for the firms that had suffered the pesification and freezing of their rates, and 
that served the domestic market, such as the distributors of gas and electricity, and the 
telephone companies. These firms were all heavily indebted in foreign currency. 
Though at first the majority of firms did not comply with payment of principal, a 
great majority did meet interest payments. In this dimension, the default on private debt 
was much less severe than the default of government debt. The financial sector, which had 
issued short-term bonds (valores de corto plazo), whose maturity was less than a year, 
mostly  complied  with  the  payments  of  principal.  By  mid-2002,  there  were  already 
renegotiations  underway  in  some  important  firms  (Pecom,  Banco  Hipotecario,  Impsa, 
Capex, Aeropuertos 2000), with a high percentage of acceptance by bondholders. The new 
conditions  were  relatively  good  and  did  not  include  either  haircuts  on  principal  or 
pesification, though there were extensions of maturity and, in some cases, reductions of 
interest  rates.  Subsequently,  the  restructuring  of  private  debt  came  in  all  sorts  of 
combinations:  extension  of  maturities,  lower  interest  rates,  repayment  of  principal  in 
installments, haircuts on principal, early redemption at a discount. In all cases this implied a 
larger or smaller loss, in terms of present value, to the bondholders. Around 2003, with   8 
several  restructurings  already  completed,  the  market  value  of  these  bonds  started  to 
improve. This was due to improved economic conditions and the normalization of markets, 
as well as the anticipations of future debt renegotiations. 
 
Figure 2. Corporate bond issuers and number in default, March 1992- December 2005 
Source: based on firms rated by Standard & Poor’s in Argentina. 
 
Due to widespread corporate default, after the 2001 debt crisis the corporate bond 
market came to a standstill. As Figure 2 shows, about 2/3 of corporate issuers rated by 
Standard & Poor’s went into default during 2002, and the process of renegotiation was 
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B. Secondary markets 
 
Figure 3 shows the yield curves for most liquid corporate bonds traded on the Mercado 
Abierto Electrónico (MAE). When a log curve is fitted to the data, one can clearly see that 
the curves shifted up over time, between 1994 and 1998, and again between 1998 and 2001. 
 
Figure 3. Yield curves for corporate bonds 
Source: based on most liquid corporate bonds, individual trades on Merval for 1994 and Hechos, MAE for rest. 
 
We would have expected to see higher rates of return on corporate bonds in 2001, in 
view  of  the  financial  crisis,  and  of  the  widely  announced  and  impending  death  of 
Convertibility.  Figure  4  compares  the  evolution  of  a  reference  rate  for  medium  term 
corporate bonds between April 1998 and December 2001, when the crisis burst and the 
market practically disappeared, with the rate of return on a representative sovereign bond, 
the FRB. The FRB had a maturity of 7 years in April 1998, and of 3.3 years in December 
2001.  To  construct  the  reference  rates  for  medium  term  corporate  bonds,  we  used  the 
median of the rate of return of the bonds with maturities above one year and up to three 
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whose  rates  of  return  were  computed  by  MAE  and  reported  in  the  monthly  issues  of 
Hechos (note that the set of corporations changes over time). 
Figure 4. Rate of return on sovereign and medium term corporate bonds 
 Source: based on Hechos, MAE, April 1998-December 2001. 
 
The reference rate of return for medium term corporate bonds moved together with 
the FRB over most of this period. This is in agreement  with the conventional view in 
Argentina that the risk of private and public sector are not separable, but rather that they 
move  together  with  country  risk.  However,  as  of  April  2001  the  rate  of  return  on  the 
sovereign bond started rising steeply, while that of corporate bonds rose much more gently.  
In Figure 5 a similar procedure was followed to define a reference rate for long-term 
corporate bonds. However, in this case there are usually only between one and three bonds, 
and in several months there is no data at all, especially during 2001, so this long term 
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of both series over time was much closer. However, one again sees that there is a point 
where the series drift apart, in this case in July and August 2001. 
Figure 5. Rate of return on sovereign and long term corporate bonds 
 Source: based on Hechos, MAE, April 1998-December 2001.  
 
Table  4  gives  as  an  example  one  particular  long-term  market  bond  issued  by 
Transener, a company engaged in the transmission of electric energy. As the table shows, 
the rate of return rose slightly in November 2001. However, there were very few trades, and 
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Table 4. Trades of long-term bond from Transener on MAE 
Month  Maturity 
(in years) 





Amount traded  
(in dollars) 
Turnover 
(amount traded /amount 
outstanding) 
Sep-98  9.6  14.55  6  10,744,194  7.2 
Oct-00  7.5  11.79  4  4,948,133  3.3 
Feb-01  7.2  11.64  8  9,822,179  6.5 
Nov-01  6.4  20.68  2  1,252,504  0.8 
Source: based on Hechos, Mae and our database. 
 
A possible explanation for the discrepancy between both sets of rates of return is 
that the prices of corporate securities were not as representative as sovereign bonds. The 
domestic market for corporate bonds was small to start with, and it shrank even further 
during 2001. Table 5 shows the evolution of trades on the MAE over this period. This helps 
explain why there were no almost any quotes of long term corporate bonds at the end of 
2001, so the increasing risk might not have been fully reflected in market prices. 
 
Table 5. Amounts traded on MAE (in millions of dollars) 
 Period  Sovereign bonds  Corporate bonds 
1996  318,067  717 
1997  337,937  903 
1998  169,975  808 
1999  153,295  778 
2000  217,297  859 
January 2001  18,345  94 
February  19,951  86 
March  20,111  35 
April  9,155  28 
May  12,365  92 
June  18,252  39 
July  9,601  36 
August  8,032  42 
September  3,983  47 
October  5,980  50 
November  4,389  45 
December  282  29 
2001  130,446  622 
January 2002  54  3 
February  178  1 
March  485  3 
April  507  1 
May  1,026  1 
June  196  1 
July  557  0 
August  806  0 
September  296  5 
October  204  8 
November  379  15 
December  393  14 
2002  5,082  52 
Source: based on Hechos, MAE.   13 
 
Another explanation for the discrepancy between corporate and sovereign bonds 
might be due to the fact that the market considered that corporate bonds were not as risky 
as government bonds. Though in most of the Convertibility period both rates of return 
tended to move together, some corporate issuers indeed did not go into default in 2001 and 
after.  Of  those  that  did,  the  renegotiation  of  corporate  bonds  usually  implied  smaller 
haircuts for bondholders than the haircuts applied to sovereign bondholders. This might 
explain another part of the discrepancy in the yields between corporate and sovereign bonds 
in 2001. However, since there were very few trades on domestic secondary markets, we 
believe that the prices might not too representative and must be handled with care. 
The yield curves for corporate bonds from 2004 on show that the yield on corporate 
issuers that did not default, for example firms from the oil industry like Petrobras Energia 
and YPF, was lower than those that defaulted like Autopistas del Sol, Banco Hipotecario, 
Banco Galicia. The difference was around 600 basis points in August 2004, and fell to 300 
basis points in November 2005 (BCRA 2004 and 2005). We believe this spread basically 
reflects the fact that the firms that did not default were in better financial shape that those 
that did, and hence they presented a lower risk. 
To analyze the liquidity of corporate bonds, we rely on data from Mercado Abierto 
Electrónico (MAE) and the Mercado de Valores (Merval), the most important domestic 
exchanges for bonds. Other exchanges outside of Buenos Aires are not very important in 
bond trading  (Bolsa de  Rosario and  Bolsa de Bahía  Blanca, for  example, specialize in 
commodities). 
  Merval is closely related to the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires (BCBA), where 
many of the corporate bonds are listed. On the other hand, MAE is an over-the-counter 
exchange whose members are financial institutions focused on fixed income securities. To 
be negotiated on the MAE, corporate bonds have to be previously listed at the BCBA or 
some other board of trade in Argentina. Table 6 shows that the participation of MAE in the 
market for corporate bonds in Argentina is a bit larger, though the difference with Merval 
has dwindled with time (as to company shares, the two markets reached an agreement by 
which shares are only traded on the Merval since 1996).   14 
The  issues  of  national  government  bonds  tend  to  be  much  more  liquid  than 
provincial bonds, which are sometimes traded only two or three times per month (if at all). 
The same holds for corporate bonds. Indeed, despite the fact that in 2000 the stock of 
corporate bonds was 24 billion dollars, compared to 98 billion dollars of sovereign bonds 
and 4 billion dollars of provincial bonds (a ratio of 1 to 4), the total volume of corporate 
bonds traded represents a mere 1%, or less, of the amount traded in government bonds (a 
ratio of 1 to 100). 
 
Table 6. Trades on MAE and Merval, 1996-2004 
Total volume operated in MAE and MERVAL (in millions of dollars) 
  Government bonds  Shares  Corporate bonds  Total 
1996  448,744  35,221  717  484,683 
1997  407,102  41,188  1,351  449,641 
1998  204,287  30,528  1,169  235,985 
1999  187,485  12,685  1,122  201,292 
2000  245,486  9,691  1,469  256,646 
2001  147,104  7,554  1,022  155,680 
2002  16,803  1,570  111  18,484 
2003  31,468  2,897  185  34,549 
2004  51,005  4,489  601  56,095 
Share of MAE in volumes operated in MAE and MERVAL 
  Government bonds  Shares  Corporate bonds  Total 
1996  0.71  0.00  1.00  0.66 
1997  0.83  0.00  0.67  0.75 
1998  0.82  0.00  0.69  0.71 
1999  0.82  0.00  0.69  0.77 
2000  0.89  0.00  0.58  0.85 
2001  0.89  0.00  0.61  0.84 
2002  0.30  0.00  0.47  0.28 
2003  0.63  0.00  0.73  0.58 
2004  0.70  0.00  0.58  0.64 
 
  According to our database of corporate bonds, there were 68 companies with bonds 
outstanding in 2004, and 56 in 2005.  In  relation to corporate bonds that were  actually 
traded, we looked at companies whose bonds traded at least once during 2004-2005 (until 
August) in both MAE and Merval. There were 18 such companies, of which 7 were banks 
and 11 were non-financial companies. Of the 11 non-financial companies, Table 7 shows 
their liquidity of the 8 on which we had information on revenues. Except for two of the   15 
corporate bonds in Table 7, there were very few trades, and the rates of turnover were 
extremely  small.  In  fact,  the  great  majority  of  corporate  bonds  in  Argentina  resemble 
private placements, which are often tailored to specific investors and have extremely low 
liquidity. 
 
Table 7. Liquidity of corporate bonds of eight non-financial firms in 2004 




stock (millions of 
pesos) 
Days traded in 
year 





Autopistas del Sol S.A.  154  325  5  10  3 
Cablevisión S.A.  642  525  5  1  0 
Edesur S.A.  920  120  7  3  3 
Metrogas S.A.  720  321  2  2  1 
Multicanal S.A.  575  450  359  465  103 
Petrobras Energía S.A.  5494  1672  197  102  6 
Transener S.A.  220  518  1  1  0 
Transportadora de Gas 
del Sur S.A. 
905  503  11  7  1 
Source: based on database in Bedoya et al (2007), and information from Guia Senior on annual revenue. 
 
III. Asset-backed securities (ABS) 
 
The  market  for  asset-backed  securities  (fideicomisos  financieros  in  Argentina)  is  quite 
recent. The main reason was that there was no legal framework to carry out this type of 
operations until Law 24.441 created it in January 1995. It is worth mentioning that the 
drafters  of  the  law  had  securitization  of  mortgages  in  mind,  which  explains  why  Law 
24.441  was  called  the  Law  of  Financing  of  Housing  and  Construction  (Ley  de 
financiamiento de la vivienda y la construcción). Despite these intentions, this law served 
as the framework for the securitization of very diverse classes of assets, such as credit cards 
and personal loans, to a much larger degree than the securitization of mortgages. 
  The market started to operate in 1996. Table 8 shows the evolution of the stock of 
asset backed securities in terms of GDP, while Table 9 shows the stock in millions of 
dollars. The characteristics of the market for ABS in Argentina are very peculiar, basically 
very short duration, so secondary markets are hardly existent. Hence, the database from 
BanVal provides unique information related to the investors’ profiles. 
  Table 8 shows in 2002 a huge rise of ABS in terms of GDP. This is because of the 
devaluation. However, it greatly overstates the actual rise, because we have not adjusted the 
figures for the pesification of ABS that was decreed in early 2002. Many of the asset-  16 
backed securities in foreign currency were pesified at an exchange rate of 1.40 pesos per 
dollar, and the amount in pesos was indexed by CER. However, this did not happen in all 
cases, since it depended on the underlying assets and the assemblies that convened for each 
asset-backed security. 
 














Total   
1996  0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.09
1997  0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.34 0.35 0.40
1998  0.00 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.41 0.41 0.51
1999  0.01 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.72 0.75 0.85
2000  0.01 0.17 0.18 0.03 1.51 1.54 1.72
2001  0.03 0.21 0.24 0.01 2.38 2.39 2.63
2002  0.00 0.08 0.08 0.01 6.16 6.17 6.25
2003  0.04 0.05 0.09 0.02 3.15 3.18 3.27
2004  0.15 0.19 0.34 0.01 2.48 2.48 2.82
2005  0.25 0.63 0.88 0.00 1.74 1.77 2.63
Notes: Year-end figures. Based on Banval. Short-term bonds have maturities up to one year, long term more than a year. 
 















Total   
1996  0 53 53 0 200 200 253
1997  0 171 171 8 1,005 1,014 1,184
1998  7 275 281 2 1,228 1,231 1,512
1999  28 242 270 80 2,049 2,129 2,399
2000  38 472 510 85 4,277 4,362 4,871
2001  75 567 641 29 6,387 6,416 7,057
2002  0 74 74 10 5,466 5,476 5,550
2003  55 58 113 28 3,978 4,005 4,119
2004  220 289 508 14 3,714 3,728 4,236
2005  436 1,096 1,531 43 3,076 3,119 4,651
Notes: Year-end figures. Based on Banval. Short-term bonds have maturities up to one year, long term more than a year. 
 
Though the history of ABS is short, it is very rich in the sense that the qualities of 
ABS  as  financing  vehicles  were  stress-tested  in  the  2001-2002  crisis.  To  get  a  better 
understanding of the evolution of the market of ABS, Table 10 shows the yearly amounts 
issued  in  domestic  currency  (expressed  in  thousands  of  pesos)  and  in  foreign  currency 
(expressed in thousands of dollars). Note that until 2001, the peso was at a one to one parity   17 
with the dollar; after a big jump in 2002, the relation stabilized at a ratio of 3 pesos per 
dollar since 2003. 
Between 1996 and 2001, slightly more ABS were issued in foreign currency than in 
domestic currency. The average value of ABS issued in foreign currency  grew from 3 
million dollars in 1996 to 74 million dollars in 2001. In contrast, the average value of 
amounts issued in domestic currency hovered around 7 million dollars in that same period. 
The overall result until 2001 was a rapid growth of the total amounts issued, due to the 
increasing size of individual issues, rather than an increase in the number of issues. 
The market came to a standstill in 2002, just like the market for corporate bonds. 
ABS were affected by the behavior of the underlying assets. In particular, as mentioned 
above,  ABS  were  strongly  affected  by  the  pesification  of  contracts  after  the  crash. 
However, Table 10 shows that since 2003 there has been a quick comeback of the market 
for ABS. Indeed, ABS are the instruments that led the reopening of capital markets after the 
financial crash at the end of 2001. A reason for their rapid recovery was that, unlike other 
instruments, ABS were not subject to the lack of “willingness to pay”, as often happened 
with corporate bonds. 
 
Table 10. Number and amount of asset-backed securities issued 
Year  Issues in foreign currency  Issues in domestic currency  Average 
exchange rate 
  Number 
Value 
(in thousands  
of dollars) 
Average value 









(pesos per dollar) 
1996  69 200,743 2,909 53 53,073 1,001 1 
1997  44 818,003 18,591 17 121,029 7,119 1 
1998  39 237,256 6,083 18 148,089 8,227 1 
1999  50 1,103,358 22,067 26 117,976 4,538 1 
2000  53 2,535,047 47,831 51 399,693 7,837 1 
2001  36 2,667,311 74,092 51 387,517 7,598 1 
2002  6 35,803 5,967 12 24,271 2,023 3.5 
2003  11 59,798 5,436 52 236,982 4,557 3 
2004  11 33,103 3,009 208 1,602,905 7,706 3 
2005  25 205,497 8,220 353 4,373,062 12,388 3 
Total  344 7,895,919 22,953 841 7,464,596 8,876  
Source: based on BanVal. 
 
The  main  reason  for  the  relative  resilience  of  ABS  was  legal.  From  a  legal 
viewpoint, unlike corporate bonds or other debt instruments, ABS had an  encapsulated   18 
guarantee,  i.e.,  they  were  securities  that  were  not  attached  to  the  balance  sheet  of  the 
original corporation, but were rather off balance sheet financing. They were not attached to 
the ABS manager either, who merely acted as an agent of the holders of the ABS. This is 
the key point that differentiates ABS from corporate bonds.
2 
Despite being hit by pesification, this characteristic of an encapsulated guarantee 
allowed  the  rapid  comeback  of  ABS  issues,  unlike  corporate  bonds  where  there  were 
practically no new issues after the default, except for the few exceptions where the debtors 
paid on time, respecting the original terms, or where they extended the maturity but without 
imposing a discount on corporate bondholders. At any rate, the point is that encapsulated 
assets, combined with atomized debtors, turned out to be relatively resilient when compared 
to other private securities. This is significant in a country  with the history of financial 
fragility that Argentina shows. 
Analyzing what has happened from the end of 2002, ABS reflect the behavior of 
two sectors that have been very dynamic during the recovery of the Argentine economy, 
consumer durables (mainly household appliances) and exports of the agricultural sector.
3 
Without distinction of sector, very few ABS had a maturity of over one year. Reflecting the 
experiences of the recent financial crisis and the subsequent pesification, in no case were 
there funds in a currency different from its underlying asset, i.e., ABS in dollars were only 
issued when the loans encapsulated in the fund were payable in dollars. The characteristics 
as to maturity and currency can be typical of markets that emerge from sovereign default: a 
strong concentration of ABS in horizons up to 5 months at a fixed rate and denominated in 
pesos. When the maturity is over 5 months, and in pesos, the trust funds carry variable 
interest  rates,  either  in  terms  of  a  reference  interest  rate  (BADLAR)  plus  a  spread,  or 
                                                 
2 From an economic standpoint, there was also a diversification of risk, because the majority of the ABS put 
together a large sum of small consumer and personal loans, as well as mortgages. The atomized debt included 
in ABS essentially originated from the financed sale of household appliances, as well as personal credits of all 
sorts instrumented through mutuos personales, or through credit cards. Unlike a lot of corporate debt, the vast 
majority of the individual debtors complied with their debt obligations, perhaps to preserve a good credit 
record, though the encapsulated guarantee provided an incentive to comply with debt payments. 
3 Though it still has a long way to go, in 2005 the financial sector started to use ABS to securitize mortgages. 
This may expand in the future, and extend to the securitization of leasing and other assets on bank’s balance 
sheets. One reason is that the 2001 crisis showed it was extremely risky to fund long-term loans with 30-day 
time deposits. ABS may also prove to be a vehicle for big corporations to securitize their credit to suppliers, 
thus turning it into off balance sheet financing. Multinational corporations might find this attractive to not 
violate restrictions on credit risk imposed by their headquarters, while local firms might find it attractive as a 
means of finance.   19 
indexed to inflation (CER) plus a spread. These loans are basically related to financing of 
consumer loans or credit cards. As to the instruments denominated in dollars, the maturities 
were closer to one year. This basically had to do with financing of exports by small and 
medium-size agricultural producers. 
  As  Figure  6  shows,  the  evolution  of  the  market  during  2005  was  outstanding: 
whereas the amount issued during 2004 was for 1,625 million pesos (approximately 550 
million US dollars), the amount issued during 2005 was 5,125 million pesos (almost 1,700 
million dollars).  In comparison, during 2003 the total issue of trust funds only amounted to 
297 million pesos (100 million dollars). 
   
Figure 6. Monthly amount of asset-backed securities issued, 2004-2005 (in millions of pesos) 
Source: based on Banval. 
 
  ABS have allowed SMEs to access capital markets through the securitization of 
loans to finance exports of agricultural SMEs. This has been possible thanks to the financial 
structure  of  ABS,  plus  the  guarantees  in  relation  to  risk  performance  provided  by  the 
Sociedades de Garantía Recíproca (SGR), organizations of reciprocal guarantees specially 
created  to  back  loans  to  SMEs.  The  participation  of  SGR  allows  to  standardize  the 
encapsulated loans within ABS, and to have a credit risk rating, making it an eligible asset 
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Seguro de Vida). This type of structure has allowed hundreds of agricultural producers to 
access capital markets at convenient rates to finance their exports. By the end of 2005, 
around  twenty  series  of  these  ABS  had  been  issued.  They  were  usually  issued  in  US 
dollars, with maturity between 270 and  360 days. The issue in dollars was possible because 
repayment comes from export sales, so there is no currency mismatch. The maturity of 
these transactions replicated the agricultural cycle of the exported goods. 
 
IV. Deferred checks 
 
Deferred checks (cheques de pago diferido, checks with deferred payment) should not be 
confused  with  postdated  checks  (cheques  posdatados).  For  a  very  long  time,  postdated 
checks were a major source of finance for small businesses, and their use was widespread 
in  the  economy.  The  use  of  postdated  checks  was  not  unique  to  Argentina.  In  Pagano 
(2001), the chapters on Chile, Brazil and Paraguay study the use of postdated checks as an 
informal means of financing. 
Given the weak and slow legal systems to enforce debt contracts, postdated checks 
were an important informal source of finance that was backed by a legal mechanism: a 
check  that  is  issued  without  funds  is  considered  fraud,  and  the  issuer  can  be  legally 
prosecuted. 
As  to  the  deferred  checks,  they  were  created  in  1993,  when  the  longstanding 
informal practice of postdating checks was complemented by the formal figure of deferred 
checks. The minimum maturity is 30 days, and the maximum is 360 days. Deferred checks 
can be endorsed up to three times. In contrast to normal checks, where not having funds is 
considered fraud, not having funds on a check of deferred payment is simply considered 
commercial debt (Paraguay  introduced a law similar to this in 1997).  Hence, the main 
mechanism to insure payment of these checks is reputational: those with bounced checks 
are blacklisted in the private credit bureaus, and their checks are no longer accepted until 
they  are  removed  from  the  list.  In  Argentina,  the  most  important  private  credit  bureau 
recording credit history has been Veraz. 
Since December 2003, deferred checks can be publicly traded on the Mercado de 
Valores (Merval), the exchange that operates in the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires   21 
(BCBA), the Buenos Aires board of trade. Table 11 shows how the volume of deferred 
checks traded grew to around 40 million pesos in 2004, and 200 million pesos in 2005. The 
average value of checks traded was around 25 thousand pesos. The evolution of amounts 
traded each month in Figure 7 clearly shows the upward trend. 
 
Table 11. Trading of deferred checks on the Merval 
Effective value  Average value  Year  Number of  
of checks  (thousands of pesos)  (thousands of pesos) 
2003 (December)  13  329  25.46 
2004  1398  43,780  31.32 
2005  8002  208,197  26.02 
Source: based on Merval 
 
Figure 7. Monthly trades on Merval, January 2005-December 2005 
Source: based on Merval. 
 
Deferred  checks  are  short-term  instruments  similar  to  commercial  paper.  The 
average maturity was one month in 2003, when the operations started, rising to 3 months in 
2005. There are some operations with maturity of almost a year (around fifty operations 
have a negative maturity, calculated as the difference between the negotiation date and the 
maturity date, which may be due to registration errors). The effective value reported in 
Table 11 is smaller than the nominal value, because the checks are negotiated at a discount 












































































































































































































Amount negotiated Number of checks  22 
The  end-year  stock  has  been  steadily  rising,  but  the  total  values  are  still  small, 
reaching about 25 million dollars at the end of 2005, as shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Maturity and stock of deferred checks  
 
Maturity (in days)  End-year stock 





2003  35  37  23  46  329  13 
2004  72  63  -5  354  17,490  647 
2005  89  76  -24  358  74,178  2573 
Notes: Year-end figures. Based on Merval. 
 
The  trades  on  the  BCBA  represent  a  minimal  fraction  of  the  deferred  checks, 
because the only checks that can be traded are those backed by institutions that reach a 
specific  agreement  with  the  BCBA  as  to  the  guarantees  on  those  checks  (“cheques 
patrocinados” and “ cheques avalados”). 
In a personal interview in early 2006, one of the most important market operators 
from Puente Hermanos said that most of the operations were done though the system of 
“cheques avalados”, backed by Sociedades de Garantías Recíprocas discussed above for 
ABS. Due to the specific guarantees required by the Sociedades de Garantías Recíprocas, 
SMEs that use this system can pay a nominal interest rate in pesos of 7.5% per year on 
these checks of deferred payment, with a total financing cost of around 11.5% per year 
once  other  expenses  are  included  (in  case  of  non-compliance,  the  guarantee  assures 
investors that they will be paid in full at original maturity). In contrast, deferred checks that 
are issued without any guarantee can pay as much as 6% per month in pesos. This is a huge 
difference, but of course in one case there is a committed guarantee, in the other the issuer 
just puts its reputation at risk. 
There is a huge informal market that discounts these checks. Table 13 shows the 
total amount of checks that go through the clearing system (this does not include checks 
that are cashed, or that are deposited in the same bank they are drawn on). Though the 
average  value  of  these  checks  is  only  4  thousand  pesos,  the  volumes  are  large  for 
Argentina. A conservative guess is that if only 10% of the checks had an average maturity   23 
of 30 days (while the other 90% was basically used as equivalent of cash), this would give a 
stock of around 4.5 billion pesos, about 1.5 billion US dollars. 
 
Table 13. Clearing house data on checks, 2000 to 2005 
Number of checks  Value of checks  Average value    
(in thousands)  (in millions of pesos)  (in thousands) 
Year  Compensated  Rejected  Percentage 
rejected 
Compensated  Rejected  Percentage 
rejected 
Compensated  Rejected 
2000  111,036  4,328  3.90  287,928  7,481  2.60  2.59  1.73 
2001  100,789  5,488  5.45  240,003  8,387  3.49  2.38  1.53 
2002  91,112  4,305  4.73  222,429  7,646  3.44  2.44  1.78 
2003  68,728  1,314  1.91  252,970  4,057  1.60  3.68  3.09 
2004  77,764  1,435  1.85  345,172  5,062  1.47  4.44  3.53 
2005  84,211  1,708  2.03  371,540  6,462  1.74  4.41  3.78 
Source: based on BCRA. 
 
  Figure 8 shows how the use of checking accounts has evolved these last few years. 
For comparison, the figures for savings accounts are also shown. 
 
Figure 8. Annual amounts debited from checking accounts and savings accounts of the 
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Source: BCRA and Ministerio de Economía. 
   24 
In the case of checking accounts, there is a structural break in the series in 2001, 
when the use of checks fell from being about 6 times GDP, to a much lower figure of 
around 2 times GDP. This was the year when Cavallo introduced a tax of 1.2 percentage 
points on all transactions that went through checking accounts, leading to a large reduction 
in the turnover rate of checking accounts. 
The tax on checks, which applies more generally to all debits to checking accounts, 
not only affected the use of bank money as a means of payment. This also led to a huge 
increase in financing costs for SMEs, since it implies an additional 1.2 percentage points on 
every operation, regardless of maturity, and deferred checks are typically used for very 
short maturities (thirty to sixty days). Though the original idea was to consider it as an 
advance tax payment, in practice this tax has been almost impossible to deduct from other 
taxes. From the point of view of instruments of credit for small firms, it has consequently 
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